These are some observations on the attack on November 26, 2008 in Mumbai, India.
1]
All future terror strikes might now follow the same pattern of attack - Groups of terrorists armed with automatic weapons and grenades targeting a variety of targets. It can be civilian populations in residential areas, public spaces or luxury hotels - or it can be high value targets like sensitive nuclear and power installations and Indian military bases.
This form of attack not only brings very high casualty rates but also triggers a kind of psychological terror in the civilian populations and a state of chaos in its security systems.
2]
These kind of strikes not only inflicts humiliation, but when it succeeds it also hits several aspects of national life that directly impacts national development. Like a massive drop in international investments on economic projects and severely hitting tourism that sustains local industries in many states of India.
3]
The nature of the fidayeen [Islamic death squads] is to kill and die [shahadat and jannat]. They have no plans in their minds to survive and they are spiritually trained from a very young age for this purpose.
On the other hand - in the Indian security system - there is no level of training that provides a similar kind of psychological preparation and motivation levels that a trained fidayeen jihadi has.
The very presence of such terrorists therefore can cause some levels of psychological disintegration in the forces who are meant to challenge them.
4]
For example, the psychological body blow dealt on the police in the killing of three top police officers in the St. Xavier's College lane within a radius of five hundred meters of the Mumbai Police HQ located at Crawford Market is tremendous.
That is why no amount of praise or acclaim can measure up to the collective action of DB Marg cops and the sacrifice of SSI Tukaram Ombale near the Chowpatty junction on the night Nov. 26. It was probably the very last bandobust for the jihadis to punch in and head straight towards Malabar Hill and Worli residences.
5]
The attack itself is a demonstration of Doability. The very first question that emerges in the minds of the planners of this attack are - [a] Can it be done and [b] if so, how effectively can it be done.
This is a very important question as doability also establishes replication.
6]
The attack - beginning on the night of Nov. 26 2008 at approximately 21. 45 hours at VT station followed by gunfire at Leopold - and the storming of three locations - Taj Trident and Chabad House.
The attack killed 172 civilians - both Indian and foreign nationals - Eighteen Mumbai police officers. And it took more nearly 72 hours - from the night of Nov. 26 to the evening of Nov. 29 - when the last of the jehadi was liquidated at the Trident hotel at Nariman Point.
All through the seventy two hour period - the attack was on continuous international media coverage. This is the kind of exposure terror organizations seek.
The Doability and Replication questions - based on the great success of the attack has been answered in the affirmative for all planners worldwide.
7]
Success of such attacks is also important for its planners because Jihad Inc. functions much like a multinational corporation.
Just as an MNC banks on competing for and bagging international contracts to increase its share prices, groups inside the Jihad Inc. bank on the success of such carefully planned attacks to open up funds from international sources.
The success of 26/11 opened up funds of up to billions of dollars from from the Arab world - the islamists living in the US and Europe and from the Pakistani Non-Resident community.
The attacks have since been studied in depth by military and intel units world wide. One pertinent observation was made by Russian KGB Commando veteran of the Afghan war and expert on guerrilla warfare, Vladimi Klyukin. He observes that the terrorists who attacked Mumbai were "probably trained by the special operation forces called the Green Flag groups". Such training, conducted by American black or green beret instructors, involved the Pakistani elite units and the ISI as well. [Link]
Such high levels of training along with islamic indoctrination is a deadly combination and Indian security forces in all states and major cities must factor such information in their own preparatory stages in order to meet the security challenges ahead.
1]
All future terror strikes might now follow the same pattern of attack - Groups of terrorists armed with automatic weapons and grenades targeting a variety of targets. It can be civilian populations in residential areas, public spaces or luxury hotels - or it can be high value targets like sensitive nuclear and power installations and Indian military bases.
This form of attack not only brings very high casualty rates but also triggers a kind of psychological terror in the civilian populations and a state of chaos in its security systems.
2]
These kind of strikes not only inflicts humiliation, but when it succeeds it also hits several aspects of national life that directly impacts national development. Like a massive drop in international investments on economic projects and severely hitting tourism that sustains local industries in many states of India.
3]
The nature of the fidayeen [Islamic death squads] is to kill and die [shahadat and jannat]. They have no plans in their minds to survive and they are spiritually trained from a very young age for this purpose.
On the other hand - in the Indian security system - there is no level of training that provides a similar kind of psychological preparation and motivation levels that a trained fidayeen jihadi has.
The very presence of such terrorists therefore can cause some levels of psychological disintegration in the forces who are meant to challenge them.
4]
For example, the psychological body blow dealt on the police in the killing of three top police officers in the St. Xavier's College lane within a radius of five hundred meters of the Mumbai Police HQ located at Crawford Market is tremendous.
That is why no amount of praise or acclaim can measure up to the collective action of DB Marg cops and the sacrifice of SSI Tukaram Ombale near the Chowpatty junction on the night Nov. 26. It was probably the very last bandobust for the jihadis to punch in and head straight towards Malabar Hill and Worli residences.
5]
The attack itself is a demonstration of Doability. The very first question that emerges in the minds of the planners of this attack are - [a] Can it be done and [b] if so, how effectively can it be done.
This is a very important question as doability also establishes replication.
6]
The attack - beginning on the night of Nov. 26 2008 at approximately 21. 45 hours at VT station followed by gunfire at Leopold - and the storming of three locations - Taj Trident and Chabad House.
The attack killed 172 civilians - both Indian and foreign nationals - Eighteen Mumbai police officers. And it took more nearly 72 hours - from the night of Nov. 26 to the evening of Nov. 29 - when the last of the jehadi was liquidated at the Trident hotel at Nariman Point.
All through the seventy two hour period - the attack was on continuous international media coverage. This is the kind of exposure terror organizations seek.
The Doability and Replication questions - based on the great success of the attack has been answered in the affirmative for all planners worldwide.
7]
Success of such attacks is also important for its planners because Jihad Inc. functions much like a multinational corporation.
Just as an MNC banks on competing for and bagging international contracts to increase its share prices, groups inside the Jihad Inc. bank on the success of such carefully planned attacks to open up funds from international sources.
The success of 26/11 opened up funds of up to billions of dollars from from the Arab world - the islamists living in the US and Europe and from the Pakistani Non-Resident community.
The attacks have since been studied in depth by military and intel units world wide. One pertinent observation was made by Russian KGB Commando veteran of the Afghan war and expert on guerrilla warfare, Vladimi Klyukin. He observes that the terrorists who attacked Mumbai were "probably trained by the special operation forces called the Green Flag groups". Such training, conducted by American black or green beret instructors, involved the Pakistani elite units and the ISI as well. [Link]
Such high levels of training along with islamic indoctrination is a deadly combination and Indian security forces in all states and major cities must factor such information in their own preparatory stages in order to meet the security challenges ahead.
